Biobanks act as the custodians for the access to and responsible use of human biological samples and related data that have been generously donated by individuals to serve the public interest and scientific advances in the health research realm. Risk assessment has become a daily practice for biobanks and has been discussed from different perspectives. This paper aims to provide a literature review on risk assessment in order to put together a comprehensive typology of diverse risks biobanks could potentially face. (...) Methodologically set as a typology, the conceptual approach used in this paper is based on the interdisciplinary analysis of scientific literature, the relevant ethical and legal instruments and practices in biobanking to identify how risks are assessed, considered and mitigated. Through an interdisciplinary mapping exercise, we have produced a typology of potential risks in biobanking, taking into consideration the perspectives of different stakeholders, such as institutional actors and publics, including participants and representative organizations. With this approach, we have identified the following risk types: economic, infrastructural, institutional, research community risks and participant’s risks. The paper concludes by highlighting the necessity of an adaptive risk governance as an integral part of good governance in biobanking. In this regard, it contributes to sustainability in biobanking by assisting in the design of relevant risk management practices, where they are not already in place or require an update. The typology is intended to be useful from the early stages of establishing such a complex and multileveled biomedical infrastructure as well as to provide a catalogue of risks for improving the risk management practices already in place. (shrink)

This article aims to study Sufism (taṣawwuf) and inspiration (ilhâm), which is the main means of the mystical knowledge, in the thought of Ibn Taymiyya who is known generally as an exponent of a tradition grounded on the understanding of Salaf. He is considered by majority to be a rigid opponent of Sufism because of his unconventional interpretations of Sufi terminology. Also, since Ibn Taymiyya constantly offers the Qur’ān, ḥadīth, and the opinions of Salaf as the base of religious knowledge, (...) the idea that he does not lean toward inspirational and rational knowledge and he does not give a place for them in his epistemology came out and has grown in the course of time. As a result of our research, however, we realize Ibn Taymiyya admits the epistemological value of inspiration along with Sufism conditionally. While he divides Sufism into Early and Later periods, he examines inspiration in the context of knowledge (bâb al-ʿilm) which is considered to be a subcategory of supernatural events. Ibn Taymiyya, who believes that inspirational knowledge must be tested by means of the Qur’ān, Sunna, and the opinions of Salaf, without rejecting its reality, assesses the subject matter in detail through his own criteria. Therefore, this article, in which the subject is elaborated critically and descriptively, focuses on the approach of Ibn Taymiyya to Sufism and inspiration that is the basic element of Sufi knowledge. (shrink)

As in all languages, Arabic and accordingly Quran which was revealed in a clear, fluent form of Arabic language, have words and concepts that are used in various meanings. The root “SHB” is one of these words which express different meanings depending on its context. This word is used ninety seven times in name and verb form in Quran to express “the togetherness/conversation which is constituted in different places and times, by people who have different ideas and beliefs, among themselves (...) (believer- believer or nonbeliever – nonbeliever) and with others (believer – nonbeliever) in this world and in the Hereafter”. -/- In this study, the basic/root meaning of the root “SHB” is identified firstly by the help of classical dictionaries, commentaries of Quran, and poems. Then the use of this word in Quran in name and verb forms is pointed, and its meanings which differ according to the verse, to the attaching words and to the context are identified. (shrink)

Drawing on Anscombe, in this essay I argue that we should not take Aristotle to be a moral philosopher, nor a virtue ethicist. This is because contemporary virtue ethics has little to do with Aristotelian ethics. While contemporary virtue ethics (or aretaic moral theory, as one may call it) operates on the level of moral and thus categorical norms, Aristotelian ethics—an aretaic life ethics—is primarily concerned with pragmatic norms. The main question for Aristotle is what a good general conduct of (...) life is. The major concern of aretaic moral theory, on the other hand, is to provide a criterion of morally right action and hence to define the concepts of the morally right, the impermissible and moral duty in aretaic terms. This shows that contemporary authors assume a primacy of virtue, while Aristotle assumes a primacy of eudaimonia. I illustrate this distinction by addressing the question of how the virtues benefit their possessor. (shrink)

In der Geschichte des islamischen Denkens gibt es – epistemologisch und hermeneutisch – verschiedene Ansätze zwischen Sufis und Gelehrten zum Verstehen und Interpretieren von Religion und der Welt. Einige Streitthemen führten manchmal zu heftigen Diskussionen und zuweilen zu regelrechten Konflikten zwischen beiden Parteien. Hierzu gehört insbesondere das Verständnis der Sufis von der Einheit des Seins. Der andalusische Sufi Ibn ‘Arabī, der diese Theorie systematisch etablierte, stand dabei im Mittelpunkt der Streitigkeiten über seine Zeit hinaus bis heute. Der osmanische Sufi und (...) Gelehrte Muḥammad al-Ḫādimī skizziert in einer seiner Abhandlungen diese kontroversen Positionen. Darin verteidigt er den Sufi Ibn ‘Arabī und interpretiert seine Ansichten in einer Form, die von Gelehrten akzeptiert werden kann. Der vorliegende Artikel befasst sich mit dieser Abhandlung und analysiert sie inhaltlich. (shrink)

In On Not Expecting Too Much from Narrative, Lamarque (2004) challenges theories of narrative identity. For while narrativity might tell us something of interest about our selves, the requirements for this would be so strong that theories of narrative identity would not be able to meet them. In contrast, he identifies minimal conditions for narrativity, so that our identity could be of a narrative nature as well. But in that case, the concept of narrativity would be so weak that it (...) would hardly be able to tell us anything about ourselves. I first examine Lamarque's criticism of narrative concepts of identity. He shows that stories, understood in a minimal sense, are not found but told and that they establish a temporal relationship between at least two events. I then examine the concept of teleological explanations of action. Considering the problem of deviant causal chains that causalists are confronted with, they are at least a serious alternative to causal explanations of action. By doing that, I also attempt to render plausible the irreducibility of teleological explanations of action to causal ones. Subsequently, I outline some features of teleological explanations of action. Finally, I defend the idea that teleological explanations of action are essentially narrative explanations of action because they meet Lamarque's minimal conditions of narratives. I then make the case that these kinds of narratives are not trivial with respect to our personal identity but, on the contrary, are the prerequisite under which we can perceive ourselves as rational agents. (shrink)

Can video games or the playing of such games be morally objectionable? Many attempts to justify our intuitions about the morality of certain games or game activities are either unsuccessful or fall short. This is mainly due to a normative gap between reality and virtuality that classical approaches to moral philosophy cannot bridge. I am investigating to what extent an accurate action analysis can help us to justify our intuitions that, in some cases, something is ethically wrong with video games. (...) To do so, I am using Frankfurt’s volition theory to show how virtual game actions can be evaluated based on virtue ethics. This virtue ethical assessment is compatible with Ostritsch’s (2017) endorsement view. Especially in light of the gamification of our surroundings, the question of the ethical status of video gaming is becoming more and more urgent. By arguing that a virtue ethical approach can tell us more about the ethical aspects of video gaming, I will also argue that virtue ethics (because of similar problems in these fields) is promising regarding the ethics of simulation, art, and literature. (shrink)

Coronary artery vasospasm (CAVS) is a clinical entity that can cause angina, but also unstable angina pectoris, acute myocardial infarction, fatal arrhythmias, and sudden death. Although it is a condition that is usually controlled with medical treatment, more aggressive treatments may rarely be required. In this case, the patient with a known diagnosis of CAVS had multiple arrests despite optimal medical treatment. We observed that fatal arrhythmias persisted in the Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD) records, even though we implanted a stent (...) and gave the patient maximal medical treatment. We performed sympathectomy as a last resort and we did not detect any recurrence in the 6-month follow-up of the patient. ICD implantation and sympathectomy should always be considered in resistant CAVS cases. (shrink)

In On Not Expecting Too Much from Narrative, Lamarque (2004) challenges theories of narrative identity. For while narrativity might tell us something of interest about our selves, the requirements for this would be so strong that theories of narrative identity would not be able to meet them. In contrast, he identifies minimal conditions for narrativity, so that our identity could be of a narrative nature as well. But in that case, the concept of narrativity would be so weak that it (...) would hardly be able to tell us anything about ourselves. I first examine Lamarque's criticism of narrative concepts of identity. He shows that stories, understood in a minimal sense, are not found but told and that they establish a temporal relationship between at least two events. I then examine the concept of teleological explanations of action. Considering the problem of deviant causal chains that causalists are confronted with, they are at least a serious alternative to causal explanations of action. By doing that, I also attempt to render plausible the irreducibility of teleological explanations of action to causal ones. Subsequently, I outline some features of teleological explanations of action. Finally, I defend the idea that teleological explanations of action are essentially narrative explanations of action because they meet Lamarque's minimal conditions of narratives. I then make the case that these kinds of narratives are not trivial with respect to our personal identity but, on the contrary, are the prerequisite under which we can perceive ourselves as rational agents. (shrink)

Bagaimana dengan mengambil yang berbeda yang kaya dan terkenal? Pertama yang jelas-novel Harry Potter adalah takhayul primitif yang mendorong anak untuk percaya pada fantasi daripada mengambil tanggung jawab untuk dunia--norma tentu saja. JKR sama seperti Clueless tentang dirinya dan dunia sebagai kebanyakan orang, tapi sekitar 200 kali lebih destruktif amerika dan sekitar 800 kali lebih banyak daripada rata-rata Cina. Dia telah bertanggung jawab atas kehancuran mungkin 30.000 hektar hutan untuk menghasilkan novel sampah ini dan semua terjadi erosi (tidak sepele (...) karenasetidaknya 6 dan mungkin 12 ton/tahun tanah ke laut untuk semua orang di bumi atau mungkin 100 ton per Amerika, dan sebagainya sekitar 5000 ton/tahun untuk Rowling buku dan MOVies dan 3 anaknya). Bumi kehilangan setidaknya 1% dari toptanah nya setiap tahun, sehingga mendekati 2100, sebagian besar kapasitas tumbuh makanan akan hilang. Lalu ada sejumlah besar bahan bakar dibakar dan limbah yang dibuat untuk membuat dan mendistribusikan buku-buku dan film, boneka plastik dll. Dia menunjukkan kurangnya tanggung jawab sosial dengan memproduksi anak daripada menggunakan jutaan untuk mendorong keluarga berencana atau membeli sampai hutan hujan, dan dengan mempromosikan konvensional liberal kebodohan dari 3rd supremasi dunia yang menghancurkan Inggris, Amerika, dunia dan keturunannya masa depan. Tentu saja, dia tidak berbeda dari yang lain 7. 8 milyar Clueless-hanya ribut dan lebih destruktif. -/- Ini adalah tidak ada masalah makan siang gratis tulisan besar. Massa tidak bisa melihat bahwa tidak ada yang namanya membantu satu orang tanpa merugikan orang lain. Hak atau hak istimewa yang diberikan kepada pendatang baru ke dalam dunia yang penuh sesak hanya dapat meredupkanorang lain. Terlepas dari bencana ekologi besar-besaran yang terjadi di depan mereka di mana-mana sehari-hari, mereka tidak dapat pin mereka ke ibu tak terkendali "yang beragam", yang menyumbang sebagian besar penduduk dari abad terakhir dan semua itu dalam satu ini. Mereka tidak memiliki beberapa kombinasi kecerdasan, pendidikan, pengalaman dan kewarasan diperlukan untuk ekstrapolasi serangan harian pada sumber daya dan fungsi masyarakat untuk runtuhnya akhirnya peradaban industri. Setiap makan, setiap perjalanan dengan mobil atau bus, masing-masing sepasang sepatu adalah paku lain di peti mati bumi. Kemungkinan besar tidak pernah terlintas dalam pikirannya bahwa satu kursi di pesawat dari London ke San Francisco menghasilkan sekitar satu ton karbon yang meleleh sekitar 3 meter persegi es laut dan sebagai salah satu kelebihan hak dia mungkin terbang ratusan penerbangan tersebut. -/- Tidak hanya orang kaya dan terkenal, tetapi hampir semua tokoh masyarakat sama sekali, termasuk hampir semua guru, dipaksa untuk menjadi benar secara politis, yang dalam demokrasi Barat, sekarang berarti demokrasi sosial (Neomarxist-yaitu, diencerkan Komunis) supremasi dunia ketiga yang bekerja untuk penghancuran masyarakat mereka sendiri dan keturunan mereka sendiri. Jadi, mereka yang kekurangan of pendidikan, pengalaman, kecerdasan (dan dasar akal sehat), yang harus melarang mereka dari membuat pernyataan publik sama sekali, sepenuhnya mendominasi semua media, menciptakan kesan bahwa cerdas dan beradab harus mendukung demokrasi, keragaman dan kesetaraan, sementara kebenaran adalah bahwa ini adalah masalah dan bukan solusi, dan bahwa mereka sendiri adalah musuh utama peradaban. Melihat saya bunuh diri oleh demokrasi 2nd Ed (2019). (shrink)

The great chain of being is an ontological conception in which all beings, from inanimate things to God, are ranked on a scale according to their perfectness. This hierarchical scheme, though widely known in the history of ideas, was systematically addressed by Arthur Lovejoy in 1936. The great chain of being as formulated by Lovejoy is composed of three main principles, whose roots can be found in Plato and Aristotle’s philosophies. These principles are “the principle of plenitude”, “the principle of (...) gradation” and “the principle of continuity.” The first principle, the principle of plenitude, was pointed out in Plato’s philosophy and the latter two, the principle of gradation and the principle of continuity, were addressed in Aristotle’s philosophy. According to Lovejoy, these three principles were systematically addressed in Plotinus’s philosophy and became an essential part of Neo-Platonic cosmology. Platon explains the abundance of beings with reference to the absolute goodness of the God in his famous book Timaios. Accordingly, God has absolute goodness and this attribution has given rise to an abundance of beings as goodness requires the existence of things. The other two principles, the principle of gradation and the principle of continuity, were forwarded by Aristotle and through his works affected Western thought. While the principle of gradation refers to the ranking of beings in a chain based on the criteria of their perfection, the principle of continuity is the natural consequence of that ranking in that all beings share at least a minimum level of similarity. Plotinus synthesized and systematized those three principles as an expression of ranked beings specific to emanation theory and added three hypostasis -One, Nous, and Soul- in addition to the natural world addressed in Aristotle’s works. Therefore, we see that beings were ranked from inanimate things to God in Plotinus’s works. This concept of hierarchical order of beings, the great chain of being, affected many cultures and philosophical ideas from Classical Islamic philosophy to the Western tradition. In this article, we confine our subject to only Western thought, including Medieval Christian theology and philosophy, the Renaissance period, and the Age of Enlightenment as well as a peculiar implication and interpretation of the great chain of being specific to modern times. In every period we will deal with just one thinker and their ideas to demonstrate the effect of the great chain of being on those thinkers’ philosophies and systems. In this context, we examined how Thomas Aquinas used the great chain of being to justify some theological and philosophical matters and tried to show how he utilized the principle of continuity effectively to explain the relationship between matter and soul. Marcilio Ficino, a Neo-Platonist philosopher of the Renaissance period, also used the great chain of being to explain the hierarchical order of beings and their ontological relationship to the perfect being, which is God, placing them in a rising line according to their closeness to God. On the other hand, when we come to the Age of Enlightenment we see that the great chain of being continues to be apparent in some philosophical works. One example is John Locke’s famous book An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Here Locke tries to make sense of the existence of many species of spirits with reference to the great chain of being, especially by using the principle of continuity. This attempt of justification shows us that the great chain of being, as an old philosophical and ontological concept, was still used even in the Enlightenment. Finally, it would be beneficial to address how the chain of being in question was presented and understood in modern times. Unlike the justification of some philosophical or theological subjects, in modern times the hierarchical structure of the great chain of being has been anachronistically read into the theory of evolution with reference to some medieval Muslim philosophers’ works. This approach, however, springs from the figural similarities between the great chain of being and the theory of evolution, although the contents of both theories are completely different. It would be accepted easily that similarities in figure do not necessitate similarities in content. In short, the great chain of being has been very effectively used in the history of philosophy to justify different subjects in different areas such as philosophy and theology. In this article, we address the usages of the chain in question and trace its effects specific to the Western tradition from the ancient period to modern times. (shrink)

Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley’s reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be resisted. In showing why, we outline different ways in which know-how can be faked even when (...) a given performance is successful; and in doing so, we distinguish how know-how can be faked (no less than know-that) via upstream and downstream indicators of its presence, and within each of these categories, we’ll distinguish (in connection with detection resilience) both faking symptoms and (various kinds of) criteria. The unappreciated resilience of faked knowledge-how to successful detection highlights a largely overlooked dimension of social-epistemic risk – risk we face not just in our capacity as recipients of testimony, but in our capacity as both (would-be) apprentices and clients of knowledge-how. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the statements of Ibn al-ʿArabî regarding religions and beliefs through the perspectives of William Chittick and Reza Shah-Kazemi comparatively. Even though his expressions are occasionally elaborated in the light of the theory of the religious pluralism based on Western-Christian thought, by considering the universal message of the Qur’ān Chittick and Shah-Kazemi identify these expressions with “universalism.” This universalist approach bases on the distinction between “ontological will” and “religious will,” and “submission” which is (...) the substance of the term “islam.” While Chittick and Shah-Kazemi agree on issues mostly, it is possible to see that in some sense they differ from each other in their departure points and results. From this perspective, it is going to be seen that Ibn al-ʿArabî’s expressions encompass both the divine religions and other religions which do not have a revelation. To examine Ibn al-ʿArabî’s expressions by taking into account the propositions of the religious pluralism will be helpful to comprehend his outlook on the Qur’ān and the Prophet Muhammad. (shrink)

What are words? What makes two token words tokens of the same word-type? Are words abstract entities, or are they (merely) collections of tokens? The ontology of words tries to provide answers to these, and related questions. This article provides an overview of some of the most prominent views proposed in the literature, with a particular focus on the debate between type-realist, nominalist, and eliminativist ontologies of words.

Abstract: Might knowledge normatively govern conversations and not just their discrete constituent thoughts and (assertoric) actions? I answer yes, at least for a restricted class of conversations I call aimed conversations. On the view defended here, aimed conversations are governed by participatory know-how - viz., knowledge how to do what each interlocutor to the conversation shares a participatory intention to do by means of that conversation. In the specific case of conversations that are in the service of joint inquiry, the (...) view defended is that interlocutors (A, B, ... n) must intentionally inquire together into whether p, by means of an aimed conversation X, only if A,B, ... n know how to use X to find out together whether p. The view is supported by considerations about instrumental rationality, shared intentionality, the epistemology of intentional action, as well as linguistic data. (shrink)

Jack Spencer argues we should reject a decision rule called MaxRat because it's incompatible with this principle: If you know that you will choose an option, x, and you know that x is better than every other option available to you, then it is permissible for you to choose x. I agree with Spencer that defenders of MaxRat should reject this principle. However, I disagree insofar as he suggests that he and orthodox causalists are in a position to accept it. (...) Both orthodox CDT and Spencer's own theory of rational choice are incompatible with the principle as well. It is surprising to realise, but all are agreed: it can be irrational to knowingly choose the best. (shrink)

Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first (...) the extent to which content externalism is compatible with epistemic externalism; second, whether active externalism entails epistemic externalism; and third whether there are varieties of epistemic externalism that are better suited to accommodate active externalism. Finally, we examine whether the combination of epistemic and cognitive externalism is necessary for epistemology and we comment on the potential ramifications of this move for social epistemology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Understanding consciousness and its place in the natural world is one of the principal targets of contemporary philosophy of mind. Australian philosophers made seminal contributions to this project during the twentieth century which continue to shape the way philosophers and scientists think about the conceptual, metaphysical and empirical aspects of the problem. After some scene setting, I will discuss the main players and their work in the context of broader developments in the philosophy of mind.

Objective: This study was conducted to determine the validity and reliability of the Turkish version of the Hikikomori (HQ-25) scale. -/- Participants: The sample of the study consisted of 418 nursing students. -/- Methods: Language and content validity and exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis were used in the validity-reliability analysis of scale. In addition, Cronbach's Alpha coefficient, item-total score correlation, and test-retest reliability methods were used. CFA, it was observed that three-factor structure of scale was preserved in the Turkish sample (...) as well. Significant correlations were found between the scale and other scales (p<0.01). -/- Results: As a result, it was adapted into Turkish, revealing that the scale is valid and reliable in measuring the social withdrawal behavior of individuals. It is recommended to evaluate using the scale in risky groups in terms of social withdrawal. (shrink)

The philosophical significance of attitudinal autonomy—viz., the autonomy of attitudes such as beliefs—is widely discussed in the literature on moral responsibility and free will. Within this literature, a key debate centres around the following question: is the kind of attitudinal autonomy that’s relevant to moral responsibility at a given time determined entirely by a subject’s present mental structure at that time? Internalists say ‘yes’, externalists say ’no’. In this essay, I motivate a kind of distinctly epistemic attitudinal autonomy, attitudinal autonomy (...) that is relevant to knowledge. I argue that regardless of whether we are externalists or internalists about the kind of attitudinal autonomy that is relevant for moral responsibility, we should be externalists about the kind of autonomy that a belief must have to qualify as knowledge. (shrink)

Epistemic relativists often appeal to an epistemic incommensurability thesis. One notable example is the position advanced by Wittgenstein in On certainty (1969). However, Ian Hacking’s radical denial of the possibility of objective epistemic reasons for belief poses, we suggest, an even more forceful challenge to mainstream meta-epistemology. Our central objective will be to develop a novel strategy for defusing Hacking’s line of argument. Specifically, we show that the epistemic incommensurability thesis can be resisted even if we grant the very insights (...) that lead Hacking to claim that epistemic reasons are always relative to a style of reasoning. Surprisingly, the key to defusing the argument is to be found in recent mainstream work on the epistemic state of objectual understanding. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

[This is an edited version of a keynote talk at the conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS) on November 28, 2022, with some minor additions and subtractions.] -/- There has recently been widespread discussion of whether large language models might be sentient or conscious. Should we take this idea seriously? I will break down the strongest reasons for and against. Given mainstream assumptions in the science of consciousness, there are significant obstacles to consciousness in current models: for example, their (...) lack of recurrent processing, a global workspace, and unified agency. At the same time, it is quite possible that these obstacles will be overcome in the next decade or so. I conclude that while it is somewhat unlikely that current large language models are conscious, we should take seriously the possibility that successors to large language models may be conscious in the not-too-distant future. (shrink)

Ebû Bekir Zekeriyyâ er-Râzî’nin Felsefî Görüşleri: İlâhiyyât (Metafizik) ve Tabîiyyât (Doğa Felsefesi), Turgut Akyüz, İstanbul: Ravza Yayınları, 2017, 255 s.

Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their (...) groups and produce collective attitudes we cannot make sense of if we treat groups as agents. (shrink)

The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full treatment in the context of action theory - providing an analysis of how it relates to the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's account, (...) all revolving around the charge that his account contains a serious ambiguity between willing and identifying. With such objections in place, I then develop an analysis that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities that Frankfurt's analysis is prey to. I briefly distinguish ambivalence from other types of internal conflict. This paper aims to offer conceptual clarification on the phenomenon of ambivalence, which will then allow for discussions about the normative merits and demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on autonomous action, and methods of resolution of ambivalence. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between technological and human intelligence through ‘The New Natural’, a term which at once accepts the nature of technological intelligence as real instead of forever ‘artificial’. It supports an evolutionary, reciprocal relationship between humans and technology that culminates in technological singularity and rejects the primacy of human perception known to popular human access theories, before seriously considering the ‘decentered’ implications of posthuman access. In conversation with western-centric sci-fi film of the late twentieth century, then, this (...) philosophical study explores how the concept of a technology-only intelligence entity can: (1) help us dispose of the core problems often associated with human-only access, (2) neutral-ize our fears of human annihilation at the hands of technological intelligence, and (3) establish strong grounds for why we may have to push back against early conceptions of nature’s opposition to technology, if only so we may resist falling into the great, and most human-centered traps known to the Anthropocene. (shrink)

A series of papers on different aspects of practical knowledge by Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, J. C. Nyiri, Eva Picardi, Joachim Schulte Roger Scruton, Barry Smith and Johan Wrede.

Principles of chance deference face two kinds of problems. In the first place, they face difficulties with a priori knowable contingencies. In the second place, they face difficulties in cases where you've lost track of the time. I provide a principle of chance deference which handles these problem cases. This principle has a surprising consequence for Adam Elga's Sleeping Beauty Puzzle.

Creation or becoming as a philosophical and theological problem has always been one of the main controversial issues of philosophers and theologians. It is sometimes defended that creation is an instant act or event; sometimes it is thought that creation is a process without a beginning. In this article, the approaches of Ibn Arabī and Ibn Taymiyya to the issue of creation are examined and compared. These two scholars mainly advocate that it is not possible for creation to begin at (...) a certain time as an instant event. According to them, while nothing material can be co-eternal with God, He has always been creating and manifesting from eternity because of His perfection. This study argues that when this issue is taken in its various aspects, it will be seen that Ibn Arabī and Ibn Taymiyya stand together about the issue against both philosophers and theologians. (shrink)

This article aims to elaborate on the pre-Ghazzālī period Sufis’ approaches to the concept of knowledge. We know that Ghazzālī, as a milestone in the Islamic thought, satisfies in taṣawwuf after a long quest. He benefits from the Sunnī taṣawwuf already established before him. Therefore, the importance of the sources feeding Ghazzālī’s Sufi view is manifest. Thus, in this article, I focus on the ideas of the main figures of the Sunnī taṣawwuf regarding the concept of knowledge. Having stated concisely (...) about what taṣawwuf is, the concepts of knowledge and gnosis were described. And then, the ideas of the Sufis on knowledge and its ways were examined. I concluded at the end of the research that the Sufis restrict human reason (ʿaql) into the worldly life while giving the intuitional knowledge priority. Also, they separate the reality (ḥaqīqa) from religious law (sharīʿa). For the former, intuitional knowledge is a necessity, while the human reason is useful and responsible for the latter. Finally, it is hard to say that compared to Ghazzālī, Suhrawardī, and Ibn al-ʿArabī, those Sufis have a consistent epistemology when they set forth their view. (shrink)

Orthodox causal decision theory is unstable. Its advice changes as you make up your mind about what you will do. Several have objected to this kind of instability and explored stable alternatives. Here, I'll show that explorers in search of stability must part with a vestige of their homeland. There is no plausible stable decision theory which satisfies Savage's Sure Thing Principle. So those in search of stability must learn to live without it.

Knowledge, despite the fact that there is no a complete definition yet, is one of the main discussion issues of philosophy, theology and tasawwuf. Some claim that knowledge occurs by means of reason that processes data transmitted by sense organs while others claim that knowledge occurs by means of a light released in the heart of humans. Since it is not mutual for all humans to have the light in the heart, focusing on the other way of knowledge, that it (...) is to follow reason, seems more significant and remarkable at this stage. In this respect, we attempt to investigate in this article how to treat reason and rationality in Iḥyā al-ʿulūm al-dīn, the work of Ghazzālī who has a strong impact on the Islamic thought. In this article our purpose is not to draw an exhaustive profile of Ghazzālī but to make an assessment for neutral, positive and negative statements of Ghazzālī with respect to reason and rationality in the work. While explaining his neutral statements it is a requirement to touch on the terms heart (qalb) and knowledge (ʿilm) as well because they are relevant to the subject of reason. The work, Iḥyāwas written by Ghazzālī for those who are responsible to preach to and have a close connection with masses. Since reason is the tool of knowledge only shared by all humanity, studying the ideas, especially ideas on reason and rationality found in this work gains importance. (shrink)

Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ are one of the most significant groups of authors of Islamic thought. Their teachings became influential where philosophy and Sufism and reason and intuition came together. Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ adopted Neoplatonic philosophy to Islamic thought and affected the course of events and developments of Islamic philosophy and Sufism. Nevertheless, some researchers claim to have Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ evaluated issues superficially and not had original ideas and approaches. However, the fact that Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ throughout their thoughts constituted a consistent relationship between (...) cosmology and epistemology is a valuable success. This article aims to examine how Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ approached their concept of reason (al-ʿaql). It is possible to evaluate the concept, reason, in the contexts of cosmology, morality, and epistemology. Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ also used this concept carefully and consistently by taking those contexts into consideration. Reason, which refers to an important communication channel between God and human beings, is the most human side of the soul. At the end of this research, we reached the conclusion that Ikhwān al-ṣafā’ accept even the intuition and revelation as rational activities. (shrink)

Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temporal phenomenology—the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. We empirically investigate a particular version of the temporal belief hypothesis according to (...) which future-bias is explained by the belief that time robustly passes. Our results do not match the apparent predictions of this hypothesis, and so provide evidence against it. But we also find that people give more future-biased responses when asked to simulate a belief in robust passage. We take this to suggest that the phenomenology that attends simulation of that belief may be partially responsible for future-bias, and we examine the implications of these results for debates about the rationality of future-bias. (shrink)

Decision-making under normative uncertainty requires an agent to aggregate the assessments of options given by rival normative theories into a single assessment that tells her what to do in light of her uncertainty. But what if the assessments of rival theories differ not just in their content but in their structure -- e.g., some are merely ordinal while others are cardinal? This paper describes and evaluates three general approaches to this "problem of structural diversity": structural enrichment, structural depletion, and multi-stage (...) aggregation. All three approaches have notable drawbacks, but I tentatively defend multi-stage aggregation as least bad of the three. (shrink)

There is a standard story told about the rise and fall of ordinary language philosophy: it was a widespread, if not dominant, approach to philosophy in Great Britain in the aftermath of World War II up until the early 1960s, but with the development of systematic approaches to the study of language—formal semantic theories on one hand and Gricean pragmatics on the other—ordinary language philosophy more or less disappeared. In this paper we present quantitative evidence to evaluate the standard story (...) of the rise and fall of ordinary language philosophy, building on the topic model of over 30,000 philosophy articles in Weatherson (2022). Using a combination of qualitative judgment and a topic-model-based measurement of similarity between individual articles, we find evidence that supports the first part of the standard story, according to which ordinary language philosophy arises in the 1940s, peaks between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, and then rapidly declines. But we argue that there is also evidence of a "new wave" of ordinary language philosophy in the early 21st century that defies the second part of the standard story. (shrink)

What is the biological function of perception? I hold perception, especially visual perception in humans, has the biological function of accurately representing the environment. Tyler Burge argues this cannot be so in Origins of Objectivity (Oxford, 2010), for accuracy is a semantical relationship and not, as such, a practical matter. Burge also provides a supporting example. I rebut the argument and the example. Accuracy is sometimes also a practical matter if accuracy partly explains how perception contributes to survival and reproduction.

The norm of assertion, to be in force, is a social norm. What is the content of our social norm of assertion? Various linguistic arguments purport to show that to assert is to represent oneself as knowing. But to represent oneself as knowing does not entail that assertion is governed by a knowledge norm. At best these linguistic arguments provide indirect support for a knowledge norm. Furthermore, there are alternative, non-normative explanations for the linguistic data (as in recent work from (...) Van Elswyk). Direct arguments would rely on normative judgments about the permissibility or impermissibility of assertions with and without the speaker knowing the content asserted. John Turri's work experimental results purport to show that our norm of assertion is factive, and probably knowledge. But as a number of recent experimentalists (Kneer, Reuter and Broessel, Marsili and Wiegmann) have shown, Turri's results rely on the problemmatic use of 'should' as in 'Maria should assert that she owns a 1990 watch.' Correcting for this, these experimentalists provide strong evidence that our norm of assertion is not factive. The standard reply to evidence like this from the assertion of unlucky falsehoods is the excuse maneuver. But Marsili and Wiegmann, following Turri's protocol for testing for excuse validation, show that participants who judge that assertions unlucky falsehoods are permissible are not guilty of excuse validation. Given our current understanding of the experimental evidence, knowledge is not our norm of assertion. (shrink)

“How can I, who am thinking about the entire, centerless universe, be anything so specific as this: this measly creature existing in a tiny morsel of space and time?” This metaphysically self-deprecating question, posed by Thomas Nagel, holds an insight into the nature of personhood and the ordinary ways we value it, in others and in ourselves. I articulate that insight and apply it to the phenomena of friendship, companionship, sexuality, solitude, and love. Although love comes in many forms, I (...) say, it always involves a sense of wonder at a finite creature thinking infinite thoughts. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to stylistically analyze the common symbols in Charles Dickens’s Christmas Books, which revived the Christmas spirit in the dark Victorian era. Experiencing the vast impacts of Industrial Revolution, people in Dickens’s time were suffering from the consequences of industrialism, poverty, class distinctions and shifting values within a dark world. Upon combining sentimentality towards human nature, Dickens, in his Christmas stories, revived a festival which faded away from English life during the 19th c. Through this (...) blending of a Christmas spirit in the dark Victorian era, Dickens drew the desired picture of a better future for his readers. His ‘Dickensian’ style enables questioning and judging the discrepancies in the society and the defects of humanity while entertaining the reader with the concerns of family harmony, forgiveness, charity, happiness, compassion and Christmas joy. Yet instead of presenting his messages explicitly, in the deeper structure, Charles Dickens directs his readers through the messages with the use of symbols in his five Christmas stories. To this end, this study aims at clarifying the common symbols in the stories of Christmas Books to suggest that Dickens lights a candle via his stories for his readers who were imprisoned in the dark Victorian age. (shrink)

Common everyday materials such as textiles, foodstuffs, soil or skin can have complex, mutable and varied appearances. Under typical viewing conditions, most observers can visually recognize materials effortlessly, and determine many of their properties without touching them. Visual material perception raises many fascinating questions for vision researchers, neuroscientists and philosophers, yet has received little attention compared to the perception of color or shape. Here we discuss some of the challenges that material perception raises and argue that further philosophical thought should (...) be directed to how we see materials. (shrink)

In this chapter, we consider ethical and philosophical aspects of trust in the practice of medicine. We focus on trust within the patient-physician relationship, trust and professionalism, and trust in Western (allopathic) institutions of medicine and medical research. Philosophical approaches to trust contain important insights into medicine as an ethical and social practice. In what follows we explain several philosophical approaches and discuss their strengths and weaknesses in this context. We also highlight some relevant empirical work in the section on (...) trust in the institutions of medicine. It is hoped that the approaches discussed here can be extended to nursing and other topics in the philosophy of medicine. (shrink)

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. But it is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler's recent book, *Minimal Morality* seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel "two-level" social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant's categorical imperative (...) is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler's informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler's conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler's contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary. We show that the problem lies not in contractarians' immodest ambitions but in the modest resources rationality can offer to satisfy them. (shrink)

There is a widespread, popular view—and one I basically endorse—that Nietzsche is, in one sense of the word, a nihilist. As Arthur Danto put it some time ago, according to Nietzsche, “there is nothing in [the world] which might sensibly be supposed to have value.” As interpreters of Nietzsche, though, we cannot simply stop here. Nietzsche's higher men, Übermenschen, “genuine philosophers”, free spirits—the types Nietzsche wants to bring forth from the human, all-too-human herds he sees around him with the fish (...) hooks, as he says, of his books—seem to engage in what looks like valuing. These free spirits are supposed to revalue the old values—revaluing, as is clear from the texts, is not simply to remove the old values from circulation (Nietzsche uses “umwerten” and not “entwerten”)—and they are supposed to create new values. And, of course, Nietzsche himself, free spirit that he is, takes on the task of revaluing all values and seems to assert many a strident evaluation. So we need to say more here. What are Nietzsche and his free spirits up to when they engage in what looks, for all the world, like a practice of valuing? What is the practice of valuing Nietzsche is recommending for his free spirits? I argue for two claims: (i) First, we end up facing an interpretive puzzle when we attempt to explain how Nietzsche's free spirits are supposed to engage in a practice of valuing. (ii) Second, we can solve the interpretive puzzle by taking Nietzsche's free spirits to be engaged in a fictionalist simulacrum of valuing. (shrink)